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JAY'S FEDERALIST
JAY'S FEDERALIST - TREATISE FOR
FREE GOVERNMENTt
By Gorr= DzE*
I.
John Jay, who held the post of Secretary for Foreign
Affairs when the Federalist Papers were written, had from
the beginning a share in that enterprise. As his biographer
points out, the precise origin of the idea of the work arose
"from one among the many conferences of Jay and Hamil-
ton, possibly early in October, 1787." 1 The original partner-
ship is evidenced by the fact that the introductory essay,
written by Hamilton, is immediately followed by four
essays written by Jay. The collaboration between the two
seemed to be natural in view of the fact that Jay's consti-
tutional opinions, - we need only think of his desire to
reduce the States to administrative units and his advocacy
of a hereditary upper house,2 - closely resembled those
of Hamilton. Madison, on the other hand, was not taken
into the Federalist partnership until the latter part of
November, having been approached by Hamilton only as a
last resort after close political friends, such as Duer and
Gouverneur Morris, had failed him. However, Jay fell ill
before the end of November, and as late as the following
February the excruciating pains he suffered prevented any
continuous writing. He wrote only one more essay in March
1788, No. 64, with Hamilton and Madison sharing in the rest
of the total of eighty-five essays.4 Thus Jay's major con-
tribution toward the ratification of the Constitution was
probably not his writing in the Federalist, but, rather, his
"Address to the People of New York", published about the
middle of April, 1788.'
t This article forms part of a comprehensive study of the Federalist
which Professor Dietze intends to publish as a book next year. See, in
this connection, the author's Hamilton's Federalist - Treatise for Free
Government, 42 Cornell L. Q. 307 (1957) and in the forthcoming summer
issue thereof (1957), as well as Madison's Federalist - Treatise for Free
Government, in the forthcoming fall issue of the Georgetown L. J. (1957).
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1948, Dr. Jur., 1949, University of Heidelberg; A.M., 1951, Ph.D., 1952,
Princeton University; author, Ueber Formulierung der Menschenrechte,
(Berlin 1956), and various articles in American and European journals.
'FRANK MONAGHAN, JOHN JAY: DEFENDER OF LIsERTY (1935), 289.
'See Jay's letter to Washington of Jan. 7, 1787, in HENRY P. JOHNSTON,
(ed.), THE CORREPONDENCE AND PUBLIo PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, III, 227-28.
3(Cf. Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers,
Win. & Mary Q., 3rd series, I, 247 (1944).
4 MONAGHAN, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 290. For the authorship of Hamilton and
Madison, see Adair, op. cit., ibid, 97-122; 235-64.
5 Published in JOHNSTON, (ed.), op. cit., supra, n. 2, III, 294 ff.
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However, it would be wrong to imply from Jay's rela-
tively few essays that his contribution to the Federalist was
unimportant. Quite the contrary was the case! Jay, who
according to John Adams was, among the early Federalists,
"of more importance than any of the rest, indeed of almost
as much weight as the rest",6 enjoyed, at the time the Con-
stitution was before the ratifying conventions, a far greater
prestige than his younger collaborators. Having served at
intervals as a delegate to the Continental Congress of 1774
and to the Congress which declared Independence, Jay had,
after a spell in New York politics which included the office
of Chief Justice of the State, become President of Congress
in December, 1778. In the following year, he was appointed
ambassador to Spain and shortly afterwards, in 1781, he
became one of the commissioners for the peace negotiations.
Jay had thus played an active political and diplomatic role
before and during the War of Independence, whereas
Hamilton and Madison, although by no means inactive
during the war, "were of a succeeding generation, men
formed in and by the revolution itself".7 Having "imbibed
the Spirit of the revolution",' - a spirit which Jay helped
to frame, - they played a more active part on the political
stage after the war. Jay's connection with the Federalist
enterprise thus gave these papers "more consideration than
both the other writers could have given them",9 the more
so since it was sickness only that prevented Jay from taking
a more active part in the writing of the Federalist and not
a disagreement with the purpose and content of the work,
with which he remained associated to the very end.
Aside from the difference in the quantitative contribu-
tion to the Federalist, the essays of Hamilton and Madison
can be distinguished from those of Jay with respect to
their content. Hamilton and Madison had, in the post war
years, a first hand experience of the system of government
under the Articles of Confederation. They had seen a
marked decline of freedom through the establishment of
legislative supremacy and the ensuing sheer majority rule
in many of the States, resulting in infringements upon the
rights of the minority and the individual. Consequently,
their essays are mainly concerned with the internal ad-
vantages the American people could expect from an adop-
I To James Lloyd on Feb. 6, 1815, in CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, (ed.), THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, X, 115.1 JOHN QuINcY ADAMS, AN EULOGY ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF JAMES
MADISON (1836) 16.
8 Ibid.
I ADAMS, (ed.), zoe. cit., 8upra, n. 6.
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tion of the Constitution that established a more perfect
Union. Fundamentally, Hamilton and Madison are dealing
with the relation between the individual and the state, from
a theoretical as well as a practical point of view. On the
whole, their arguments run like this. Being aware that the
state of nature is a bellum omnium contra omnes, the in-
dividuals in order to be protected from the vicissitudes of
anarchy, conclude a social contract through which society
is established. The government most likely to protect the
individual is one in which he has a right to participate,
that is, popular government. This is a representative ma-
jority rule. Since, however, popular government is nothing
but a means to secure the individual's life, liberty and prop-
erty, popular participation in government must be subordi-
nate to the citizen's protection from government, and the
majority prohibited from oppressing private rights. This
type of government, in which the liberal protection prin-
ciple has primacy before the democratic participation prin-
ciple, corresponds to Hamilton's and Madison's ideal of
Free Government. In view of the existence of an oppres-
sive majority rule in various States, that ideal is negated
under the Articles of Confederation because the weak
national government is in no position to prevent the oppres-
sion of the individual by the State legislatures. On the
other hand the Constitution, establishing a stronger na-
tional government, realizes Free Government to a sub-
stantial degree because under the new system a majori-
tarian tyranny on the State level is not likely to exist,
while, simultaneously, a Congressional despotism is, owing
to the separation of powers, rendered improbable. In the
period preceding the writing of the Federalist, both Hamil-
ton and Madison noticed with grave concern the infringe-
ments of the individual's liberties by "interested and over-
bearing" majorities," or factions, in some of the States.
Consequently, a distrust of sheer majority rule, as reflected
in the most democratic branch of government, the legisla-
ture, runs through their essays. Therefore, their advocacy
of a stronger Union is primarily in praise of a means to
secure the individual's freedom from the majority and to
create Free Government.
In contrast to his collaborators, Jay, in the Federalist,
does not offer a systematic theoretical account on the rela-
tion of the individual to the state and the organization of
10 The words are used by Madison In the FEDERALiST. THE FEDERALIST,
No. 10, at 54 (Modern Library ed. 1937). Quotations from THE FEDERAIST
will hereinafter be cited by number and page only, i.e., 10, 54.
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government, nor does he deal with the internal aspect of
the United States under the Articles of Confederation and
the Constitution to any large extent. Jay had not partici-
pated in the Philadelphia Convention in which Madison
and Hamilton played more or less prominent parts. At that
time and in the preceding years, he served as Secretary
for Foreign Affairs of the Confederation, following various
diplomatic missions to Europe. He was thus especially
fitted to write on the international relations of the United
States and the treaty power of the new government, and to
point out to the American people the advantages they could
expect from a ratification of the Constitution in the inter-
national field. His essays start out from the premise that
under the Constitution the United States would be a sub-
ject of international law, that is as one state, a premise
both Hamilton and Madison are careful to establish. Con-
sequently, Jay advocates the more perfect Union primarily
as a means which is to secure the American's freedom from
foreign nations.
II.
Jay's essays contain an enthusiastic confession to the
Union cause, possibly the most romantic that was ever
made by a leading American. Admonishing his country-
men to stay united, Jay brings forth in the Federalist an
idea which was pronounced by Patrick Henry in the First
Continental Congress and which was taken up by Lincoln
after the outbreak of the Civil War," namely, that the
Union is older than the Constitution. Jay is pleased to note
that "independent America was not composed of detached
and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, wide-
spreading country was the portion of our western sons of
liberty". 2 He continues:
Henry's words were:
"The distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers
and New Englanders are no more. I am not a Virginian, but an Ameri-
can... All distinctions are thrown down. All America is thrown into
one mass."
EDMUND BURNETT, LETTRS OF THE MEMBERS OF THIE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS, I, 14-15. Lincoln stated:
"Union Is perpetual . . .much older than the Constitution. It was
formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774 .... matured and
continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further
matured by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And finally, in 1787,
one of the declared objectives for ordaining and establishing the Con-
stitution was 'to form a more perfect union'."
RIcHARDSON, (ed.), MESSAOES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, VI, 5.
32,8&
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"Providence has in a particular manner blessed it
with a variety of soils and productions, and watered
it with innumerable streams, for the delight and ac-
commodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navi-
gable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders,
as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in
the world, running at convenient distances, present
them with highways for the easy communication of
friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and ex-
change of their various commodities."'"
To this one-country idea Jay adds the concept of the
one-people:
"With equal pleasure I have often taken notice that
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected
country to one united people - a people descended
from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion, attached to the same
principles of government, very similar in their man-
ners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels,
arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a
long and bloody war, have nobly established general
liberty and independence."' 4
To render the picture of American unity complete, Jay
adds to his one-country and one-people concept that of one-
nation:
"This country and this people seem to have been
made for each other, and it appears as if it was the de-
sign of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and
convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other
by the strongest ties, should never be split into a num-
ber of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties ... To
all general purposes we have uniformly been one
people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying
the same national rights, privileges, and protection.
As a nation we have made peace and war; as a nation
we have vanquished our common enemies; as a nation
we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and en-
232,9.
"Ibid. The similarity of this passage to Chief Justice Chase's dictum in
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (U. S., 1869), that the Union came into
being "out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles,
similar Interests, and geographical relations", Is striking.
1957]
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tered into various compacts and conventions with for-
eign states."'15
Not only is the Union older than the Constitution. It
is also older than the Articles of Confederation, for "[a]
strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced
the people, at a very early period,... at a time when their
habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens
were bleeding, . . ." "to institute a federal government" in
order to "preserve and perpetuate" the Union. 6 The
Articles were thus nothing but a confirmation of some-
thing already existent and, to Jay's regret, not too strong a
confirmation. Complaining about the weakness of the na-
tional government, 17 Jay finds the system of government
under the Articles "greatly deficient and inadequate to the
purposes it was intended to answer","s namely, the protec-
tion of the freedom of the American people. He advocates
the Constitution because it creates, in the more consoli-
dated Union, a prerequisite for such a protection.
With these statements proclaiming the Union as some-
thing ideally suited to American conditions, Jay laid a
solid basis upon which he could build his advocacy of a
more powerful national government as a means conducive
to the protection of the country from foreign force and in-
fluence. Warning that a partition of the United States into
thirteen States or three or four great confederacies would
lead to disaster, Jay shows the advantages of Union. It
removes the "just causes of war" which "for the most part
arise either from violations of treaties or from direct vio-
lence"' 9 because of the greater efficiency and better char-
acter of the federal government, as compared with the
State governments."° The national government, as estab-
lished under the Constitution, will therefore be in a good
position to settle international disputes.2 Furthermore, the
new Union will prevent unjust, or "pretended"22 causes of
war. Due to its increased strength, it will be in a position to
"2, 9. Jay is not quite clear as to whether the geographical unity plus
the ethnical unity constitute, while being a union, also a nation, or whether
the 'nation' comes into being only by some federal pact, such as the Articles
of Confederation. The context In which the word 'nation' is used in 2, 9,
speaks for the latter alternative: The 'nation' appears as a subject in
international law.
"2,9.
-3, 16.
2,10.
13,14.
3, 14-15.1 Essay 3.
24, 18.
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compel respect of other nations and to inhibit those nations
from attacking." Finally, the Union will prevent foreign
influence in America by depriving the States of their
quality as subjects of international law, thus rendering
political alliances of these States with foreign nations
impossible.2"
Since Jay in the Federalist deals mainly with the ad-
vantages of the Union as to the dangers from foreign force
and influence, we can hardly expect to find in his few
essays references to what constitutes the core of Hamilton's
and Madison's contributions, namely, the concept of Free
Government. Being concerned only with man's relation to
the state and, in the main, with the question to what degree
the majority should, for the sake of the individual's life,
liberty and property, be restricted, that concept has noth-
ing to do with the relations among the nations in the inter-
national sphere. This does by no means imply, however,
that Jay in the Federalist does not accept the principle of
Free Government. Not only can such an acceptance be
concluded from his partnership in the work, but it follows
from actual statements he made in his essays, no matter
how loosely these statements may often appear to be con-
nected with the idea of Free Government.
III.
Although Jay continually emphasizes the necessity of
the Union - or, what amounts to the same thing, of power
in the national government,25 - for the protection against
dangers from foreign countries, he leaves no doubt that the
Union has a further end to achieve, namely, the people's
"safety and happiness".26 The Federal Convention was con-
vened because the people wanted their threatened liberty
protected, 7 and the men at Philadelphia "joined with the
people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended
on its Union".28 Jay urges the ratification of the Constitu-
Essay 4.
' Essay 5.
U3, 13.
' 2, 8.
The quality of the Union as a means for the protection of liberty is in-
dicated in 2, 10:
"This intelligent people perceived these defects (of the Articles).
Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored to liberty, they
observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and
more remotely the latter; and being persuaded that . . . security for
both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed,
they, as with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia,
to take that important subject under consideration."
22, 12.
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tion because "'[a] n entire and perfect union will be the
solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure... religion,
liberty, and property, ... our present and future happi-
ness' .' 29 At first sight, it may appear as if Jay's mentioning
such ends of the union as the people's safety and happiness,
their life, liberty and property, means only that these rights
of the individual will be guaranteed from foreign attacks.
However, if we consider the polemics of the time in which
the challenge to individual rights had its origin mainly in
the oppressive majority rule which existed in some of the
States, we seem to be justified in thinking that Jay, when
pleading for the prosperity of America and the rights of her
citizens, recognizes the danger arising from the then exist-
ing democratic despotism, and wanted the individual pro-
tected from that quarter as much as from dangers threaten-
ing from foreign nations. This is confirmed by him in so
many words when he states that the Union, as established
under the Constitution, is securing "the preservation of
peace and tranquility" not only "against dangers from for-
eign arms and influence", but also "from dangers of the
like kind arising from domestic causes","0 that is, from
those factions that were considered by both Hamilton and
Madison the most serious danger to Free Government. We
have no reason to believe that Jay conceives of factions in
a different way than his co-authors,31 when, obviously hav-
ing in mind the infringements upon minority rights under
the Articles of Confederation, Jay complains that "the pros-
pect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good
faith and justice", and is glad that "those temptations, not
reaching the other States, and consequently having little or
no influence on the national government, the temptation
will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved".,2
Jay continues:
"[E]ven if the governing party in a State should
be disposed to resist such temptations, yet, as such
temptations may, and commonly do, result from cir-
cumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a
great number of the inhabitants, the governing party
-95, 22-23.
83, 13.
Madison gives an exposition of factions in essay 10. Although Hamilton
nowhere In the Federalist defines "faction", there can, from the context in
which he uses the term, be no doubt that it has for him the same meaning
as for Madison. Cf. 9, 47; 26, 163; 65, 424; 70, 454; 78, 508-9; 27, 167;
65, 428; 15, 92; 85, 568.
3, 15.
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may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the in-justice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the
national government, not being affected by those local
circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the
wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to
prevent or punish its commission by others."3
Thus Jay's opinion on the dangers arising from local fac-
tions and the remedy against them has great resemblance
to statements made by Hamilton and Madison in their
famous essays 9 and 10. That similarity appears especially
interesting in view of the fact that Jay, when writing the
remarks just quoted, was obviously mainly concerned with
the infringements upon the property of the minority as
they occurred at that time.34 The same apprehension can
be noticed in Hamilton's and Madison's essays.35 Therefore,
it can admit of no doubt that Jay, in the Federalist, is as
fearful of democratic despotism as are his co-authors.
This fear is based on Jay's opinion of man, which is by
no means a very favorable one. He complains:
"It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to
human nature, that nations in general will make war
whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by
it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when
their nations are to get nothing by it, but for pur-
poses and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for
military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition,
or private compacts to aggrandize or support their par-
ticular families or partisans."36
Man is depicted as jealous,87 who, motivated by the "dic-
tates of personal interest",3' is likely to "swerve from good
faith and justice". 9 There will often be "little room for...
calm and mature inquiries and reflections", 0 and people
are likely to be deceived and deluded.4 ' On the other hand,
- Ibid, 15-16.
"Of. his letters to John Adams of Nov. 1, 1786 and Feb. 21, 1787; to
Jefferson of Aug. 18, 1786, Oct. 27, 1786, April 24, 1787; to Washington of
Jan. 7, 1787 - HENRY P. JOHNSTON, (ed.), THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, III, 214, 234, 210, 212, 244, 226. In the Federalist,
Jay says that "the case of the treaty with Britain adds great weight" to
his reasoning (3, 15), probably having in mind the infringement of the
rights of Englishmen and former loyalists.
1Cf. the author's articles cited in the first (t) footnote.
"4, 18.
5, 23-25.
2, 11.
-3,15.
2, 10.
"-2, 11.
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Jay admits that there are positive qualities in man. He is
glad to note that the majority of the American people,
when accepting certain recommendations of the Congress
of 1774, "reasoned and decided judiciously",42 and that "this
intelligent people perceived and regretted" the defects of
the Articles of Confederation.43 The Federal Convention,
he feels, was composed of men many of whom "had become
highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, and wis-
dom", who were not "awed by power, or influenced by any
passions except love for their country".44 Also, Jay ex-
presses his confidence in the new national government,
trusting that, since it will be composed of the "best men in
the country",45 its administration, political counsels and
judicial decisions will be "more wise, systematical, and
judicious than those of the individual States",46 and wisdom
and prudence will govern its decisions. 7
Jay, by not committing himself as to the nature of man,
puts himself, just as Hamilton and Madison do, in a posi-
tion which is most advantageous for an adherent of Free
Government. By depicting man as bad and passionate, he
can denounce the system under the Articles of Confedera-
tion for being too democratic and thus oppressive of
minority rights. On the other hand, by describing man as
good and reasonable enough to be trusted with self-govern-
ment, as provided for by the Constitution, Jay can come
forward with his advocacy of the new government. ,
The new system is to be recommended because it
diminishes, while remaining a popular government, the
chances of faction and democratic despotism. This is due to
a selective process by which the national government will
become a highly refined body.
"[A] lthough town or country, or other contracted
influence, may place men in State assemblies, or sen-
ates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet
more general and extensive reputation for talents and
other qualifications will be necessary to recommend
men to offices under the national government, - especi-
ally as it will have the widest field for choice, and never
experience that want of proper persons which is not
uncommon in some of the States."4
Ibid.
"2, 10.
"Ibid, see also 8, 13; 3, 15.
"3, 14.
-3, 15.
"73, 16.
,8 3, 14-15. A similar statement is made at 4, 20.
[VOL. XVII
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Owing to its superior composition, the national government
is unlikely to be swayed by passions that result in vio-
lence.49 Rather, its proceedings will be characterized by
"moderation and candor".50 Being "more temperate and
cool" in their deliberations,"' the national government will
be relatively free from those local factions that result in
grave injustice toward minorities in the States.52
Seeing the danger to the protection of the individual's
rights arise mainly from the legislative body, Jay is careful
to point out the refined character of that branch on the
national level in essay 64, where he comments on the treaty-
making power. It is in this essay where Jay's distrust of
democracy seems to be most evident. On the whole, it may
be said that his scepticism toward popular government in-
creases with the immediacy of that government. Jay is
happy to note that the power to approve treaties is not
vested, under the Constitution, in the popular assembly,
directly elected by the people, but, rather, in the Senate,
the members of which are appointed by the State legisla-
tures,5" which "will in general be composed of the most en-
lightened and respectable citizens", whose votes "will be
directed to those men only who have become the most dis-
tinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the
people perceive just grounds for confidence".54 Since the
Constitution excludes men under thirty from the office of
senator, "it confines the electors to men of whom the people
have had time to form a judgment, and with respect to
whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those bril-
liant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like
transient meteors, some times mislead as well as dazzle" 5
Treaties and laws will thus bear the mark of human wis-
dom rather than passion, because they are "cautiously
formed"."6
In a polemic against majority despotism in the States,
both Hamilton and Madison denounce, in the Federalist,
the mutability of the laws. In a like manner Jay considers
the instability of treaties, which after all are the supreme
law of the land, as being destructive to public morale. Con-
sequently, he lauds the new system for matching a wise
"3, 16.
"3, 17.
"3, 16.
523, 15.
64, 417-18.
64, 417.
"Ibid.
-64,419.
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mode of election by good provisions pertaining to the
tenure of senators, which will contribute to a steady policy.
Jay wrote:
"[A] popular assembly, composed of members con-
stantly coming and going in quick succession ... must
necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of those
great objects, which require to be steadily contem-
plated in all their relations and circumstances, and
which can only be approached and achieved by mea-
sures which not only talents, but also exact informa-
tion, and often much time, are necessary to concert and
to execute."57
He was glad that the Convention was so wise as to provide:
".. . not only that the power of making treaties should
be committed to able and honest men, but also that
they should continue in place a sufficient time to be-
come perfectly acquainted with our national concerns,
and to form and introduce a system for the manage-
ment of them""
Finally, Jay praises the Convention for providing for a
partial renewal of the Senators only, "for by leaving a con-
siderable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and
order, as well as a constant succession of official informa-
tion, will be preserved". 9
Although Jay likes the idea of vesting the treaty-making
power in a high-caliber legislative chamber like the Senate,
he opposes those who argue that this power should, since
treaties are to have the force of laws, exclusively reside in
that body. In this connection, he comes forth with a strict
denial of legislative supremacy. He reminds the inhabitants
of New York that "the judgments of our courts, and the
commissions constitutionally given by our governor, are
as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern,
as the laws passed by our legislature"."° Jay states that:
"All constitutional acts of power, whether in the
executive or in the judicial department, have as much
legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from
the legislature; and therefore, whatever name be given
to the power of making treaties, or however obliga-
tory they may be when made, certain it is, that the
5764, 418.
88 Ibid.
64, 419.
864, 420.
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people may, with much propriety, commit the power
to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive,
or the judicial. It surely does not follow, that because
they have given the power of making laws to the legis-
lature, that therefore they should likewise give them
the power to do every other act of sovereignty by
which the citizens are to be bound and affected."' 1
Therefore, the Constitution is to be praised for giving
the President a substantial share in the conclusion of
treaties. Since the chief executive is elected by a process
which is even more selective than the one used for the
election of senators, 2 he is likely to be a man of great in-
tegrity who in many cases will be able to assume the leader-
ship of the Senate. Jay, being afraid that the size of the
Senate might prevent an effective foreign policy under cir-
cumstances which make an immediate action imperative,
is glad to note that "those matters which in negotiations
require the most secrecy and the most despatch", can be
dealt with by the President directly, and that, on the other
hand, "should any circumstance occur which requires the
advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time con-
vene them".63 The Constitution thus provides for the com-
patibility of an effective foreign policy with the democratic
process while, at the same time, making sure that even the
more conservative chamber of the most democratic branch
of government will be checked in the exercise of its treaty
and law making power. Once treaties are approved and
ratified, Jay comments in a concluding remark against the
will of the democratic majority, "they are just as binding,
and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts
now, as they will be at any future period" 4
IV.
The preceding pages have demonstrated that Jay's
Federalist, although mainly concerned with aspects of in-
ternational relations, also deals with the position of the in-
dividual in the state. There can be noticed a distrust of
sheer majority rule and democratic despotism stemming
from an apprehension lest the individual's life, liberty and
property might be oppressed, which is so characteristic a
feature of Hamilton's and Madison's essays. Similarly the
64, 420-21.
64,417-18.
-64,420.
"64, 421.
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Union, while increasing the prestige of the nation abroad,
also has the function of securing freedom at home. This
cannot be surprising in view of the fact that Jay, by par-
ticipating in the Federalist enterprise, naturally had to
identify himself with the fundamental ideas that were ex-
pounded by his collaborators. Besides, this political belief
is absolutely in line with Jay's thinking ever since he en-
tered political life. And his early career shows him as an
unequivocal believer in a popular government which pro-
tects individual rights. 5 Few in numbers, Jay's essays in
the Federalist are, like those of Hamilton and Madison, im-
bued by the spirit of Free Government.
4 For Jay's advocacy of the protection of individual rights, see the letter
to the Committee of Correspondence at Boston of 1774, his address to the
People of Great Britain of the same year, his address to the New York
Convention, and his charge to the Grand Jury of Ulster County. Of. also
his letters to Florida Blanca of April 25, 1780; to Washington of June 27,
1786; to Jefferson of Aug. 18, 1786 and Feb. 9, 1787; to Gov. Morris of Sept.
24, 1783 - HENRY P. JOHNsTON, (ed.), THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, I, 13 ff., 17 ft., 102 ff., 158 ft., 284; III, 204-5, 211,
232, 85. C. also the letters referred to 8upra, n. 34. For his fundamental
belief in popular government, see Jay's letter to Washington of Jan. 7,
1787, ibid, 226.
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